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Abstract
This is a theory paper that advocates experimental evolution as a novel approach to study economic preferences. Economics
could benefit because preferences are exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious. Experimental evolution allows the empirical
study of preferences by placing organisms in designed environments and studying their genotype and phenotype over multiple
generations. We describe a number of empirical studies on different aspects of preferences. We argue that experimental
evolution has the potential to improve economics.
Keywords
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Introduction
We advocate using experimental evolution as a novel
approach to study economic preferences.
Preferences are statements about human nature. What do
people want? How do people make risky decisions? How do
people trade-off today versus tomorrow? Do people make
good decisions? Are people altruistic?
Until recently, investigations into the origin of preferences have been backward-looking and theoretical. Advances
in the field of experimental evolution create the possibility of
an empirical approach to the origins, and nature, of economic
preferences.
The current state of economics is that preferences are
exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious.
Preferences are exogenous in that they are taken as given
by some unspecified, implicitly biological, process.
Economics imposes no limitations on some aspects of preferences; people are left unconstrained in the sources of their
pleasure, in their attitudes toward risk, and in their level of
patience. While economics allows considerable freedom in
these aspects of preferences, standard theory imposes structural constraints and assumes high levels of consistency.
Preferences are axiomatic in that economics attempts to
derive all results from a small, coherent set of preferences.
The rigor of models based on a small set of axioms allows
economics to make unequivocal statements such as the wellknown, and widely-accepted, economic conclusion that “free
trade is good.”
Axiomatic approaches are fragile, however, in that small
problems at the foundation create much more significant
problems in other parts of the edifice. For example, “free
trade is good” primarily follows from two premises. First,
trade can improve the wealth of all trading parties, and

second, people care about their absolute wealth, and not their
relative wealth.
If, however, preference theory mischaracterizes human
nature, then economic conclusions are suspect. For example,
if people are envious by caring about relative wealth, then
free trade may make all parties richer, but may cause envious
people to be less happy.
If economics misunderstands human nature, then free
trade may simultaneously increase wealth and unhappiness.
Similarly, all economic theorems rest upon assumptions
about human nature reified in preference theory. A graduate
microeconomics text states, “Substantial portions of economic theory would not survive if economic agents could not
be assumed to have transitive preferences” (Mas-Collell,
Whinston, & Green, 1995, p. 7).
Preferences are contentious. Neoclassical and behavioral
economics are sharply divided in their views on preferences.
For every axiom of neoclassical economics, there is a behavioral economic literature that documents divergences
between actual human behavior and standard economic theories of behavior (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1979; Thaler, 1988).
Consequently, economics is built on a fragile foundation. Its core assumptions: (a) come from outside the field,
(b) are necessary for the theorems of economics, and (c)
are disputed.
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Experimental evolution is a promising new approach to
improving the economic theory of preferences.
Experimental evolution is a shorter version of the organic
process that created all species on earth, extant and extinct.
Experimental evolution studies populations of organisms
over multiple generations in replicable, constructed environments (Rose & Garland, 2009). The populations are maintained, without any external breeding, in these environments
for many generations.
Laboratory applications of experimental evolution commonly create test and control environments that differ in
exactly one attribute. The populations undergo genetic evolution, and it is possible to study the genotypic and phenotypic effects of evolution.
Experimental evolution is complementary to other
approaches. It is, however, unique in its ability to use precisely defined control and test environments to understand
events that occurred in the past. Proponents of experimental
evolution argue,
It satisfies all the elements of the classical scientific method and
provides, therefore, the most unarguable and convincing
empirical analysis of evolutionary processes . . . it can provide
rigorous testing of evolutionary hypotheses and theories that
formerly were matters only of assumption or speculation.
(Futuyama, Bennett, Garland, & Rose, 2009, pp. 26-27)

Experimental evolution uses organisms with lifespans
that are short, relative to the human lifespan. A 50-generation
experiment using an organism with a 2-week lifespan
requires 2 years or about 2.5% of the human experimenters’
lifespan. Organisms of study have included plants, viruses,
bacteria, rodents, and fruit flies.
Experimental evolution is related to, but different from,
artificial selection. Artificial selection is the process where
humans choose which organisms replicate based on particular traits. Artificial selection has, for example, created agricultural plants with desirable properties for humans. Artificial
selection, in the form of pigeon breeding, helped shape
Darwin’s evolutionary views (these influences can be seen in
the Origin of Species).
To see the differences between artificial selection and
experimental evolution, consider how selection might act on
the beak of a seed-eating bird. To study beak size via artificial selection, the investigator could select the largest beaked
individuals in the population and allow them to interbreed.
We expect the average beak size of these new lineages (plural because experimental evolution uses replicate lines) to
exceed the average beak size of the ancestral population.
The nature of the response to this selection tells us something about genetic control of beak size; however, it probably
tells us little about the selective forces that act on beak size in
nature. Suppose we hypothesize that in nature, the selective
forces on beak size flow from the sizes of seeds in the environment. Environments with big seeds select for big beaks

and so on. To test this hypothesis via experimental evolution,
we would experimentally create large seed and small seed
environments, and expose populations of birds to these
“selective environments” over many generations. We predict
that big seed environments will produce bigger beaked birds
over many generations. In this case, the experimenter does
not select which individuals reproduce. Instead, experimental evolution tests our hypothesis about the selective forces
that act on beak size.
Artificial selection remains useful (Fuller, Baer, & Travis,
2005; Garland, 2003; Hill & Caballero, 1992), while experimental evolution allows more avenues for organismic
change. Darwin noted the difference between artificial and
natural selection: “Man can act only on external and visible
characters; nature . . . can act on every internal organ, on
every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole
machinery of life” (Darwin, 1859, ch. 4).
Early selection experiments (Lynch, 1980; Wattiaux,
1968) motivated subsequent researchers. There are now
hundreds of published experimental evolution studies
addressing varied questions while utilizing varied types of
organisms (Garland & Rose, 2009). However, experimental
evolution is still in a growth phase within the natural sciences with some relatively recent papers urging more adoption of the approach (Garland, 2003; Swallow & Garland,
2005).
While experimental evolution is a relatively uncommon
approach even in the natural sciences, the idea of linking biological selection and economic preferences dates back at
least to Adam Smith. Roughly a century before Darwin wrote
The Origin of Species, Smith wrote, “Thus self-preservation,
and the propagation of the species, are the great ends which
nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals . . . endowed with a desire of those ends, and an aversion to the contrary” (p. 86, the Theory of Moral Sentiments).
In modern terminology, Adam Smith argued that preferences were shaped by biological payoffs to induce behaviors
that lead to survival and reproduction. More recently, Gary
Becker (1976) made the connection between preferences and
natural selection more explicit: “The preferences taken as
given by economists and vaguely attributed to ‘human
nature’ . . . may be largely explained by the selection over
time of traits having greater genetic fitness and survival
value” (p. 826).
Until the advent of experimental evolution, the role of
selection in shaping economic preferences was focused on
the past. However, experimental evolution now allows the
empirical study of preferences. We suggest three reasons
that experimental evolution can become important for
economics.
First, experimental evolution is a shorter version of a similar process that created humans. This provides a conceptual
motivation for using experimental evolution. Restated, one
approach to investigate the nature of preferences is to utilize
the same natural process that created those preferences.
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Second, experimental evolution can investigate questions
that are both important and unanswered by economics. Do
people discount the future exponentially or hyperbolically?
Are people altruistic? Do people use expected choice theory
or prospect theory in making decisions under uncertainty? In
each of these cases, there is a behavioral economic literature
that began decades ago; hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie,
1974; Thaler, 1981), “altruism” (Guth, Schmittberger, &
Schwarze, 1982), and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). After decades of work, and thousands of papers, economics remains divided on these questions.
It is possible to design experiments that investigate these
important questions that have remained contentious for
decades. Later in this article, we propose experiments to
investigate unanswered questions about preferences.
Third, we find valuable, economic insight in some of the
already completed experimental evolution studies. These
studies are not presented by their authors as being economic
studies, but they cover topics that are important to economics. Here are three lines of research that we feel have significant implications for economics:
First, experimental evolution has been able to increase the
lifespan of fruit flies (Rose, 1984). In this work, subsequent
generations are derived from eggs laid late in the mother’s
life. The result is that, after many generations, the average
female fly lives 42.81 days versus 33.28 days for control
flies, average male longevity increases to 44.14 days from
38.49 days. Furthermore, it is possible to study the genotypic
and phenotypic changes that accompany longer life. The
longer-lived flies develop reproductive physiology later in
their lives; there is a trade-off between early reproduction
and long life (Kirkwood & Rose, 1991).
Lifespan connects to preferences via discount rates; the
bias to current consumption assumed within economics is
often justified by invoking mortality: “The chance of death
may be said to be the most important rational factor tending
to increase impatience; anything that would tend to prolong
human life would tend, at the same time, to reduce impatience” (I. Fisher, 1930, pp. 84-85).
If discounting is caused by mortality, it is important to
understand that lifespan is endogenous to an evolutionary
process. In addition, there is a well-developed biological
theory of aging with implications both for discount rates and
for future changes in average human lifespan caused by medical technology (Charlesworth, 1980; R. Fisher, 1930;
Haldane, 1941; Hamilton, 1966; Medawar, 1946, 1952;
Williams, 1957).
Second, experimental evolution studies report that the
ability to learn is selected for in particular environments. A
pioneering study demonstrated that experimental evolution
could produce flies with improved ability to learn (Mery &
Kawecki, 2002). A related study, using a refined framework,
created environments that both selected for, and against,
learning; there are some environments where learning has
negative reproductive consequences (Dunlap & Stephens,

2009). Furthermore, greater capacity to learn is not free; flies
that had evolved to be better learners were less successful in
competing for survival against other flies (Mery & Kawecki,
2003).
Education is a large topic within economics with many
different themes, including human capital formation
(Heckman, 2000), payoffs to education (Lundvall & Johnson,
1994; Magnuson, Ruhm, & Waldfogel, 2007), rewards to
different types of abilities (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008),
and the impact of technological change (Acemoglu, 2000;
Goldin & Katz, 2009; Levy & Murnane, 2003). Experimental
evolution provides the ability to run controlled experiments
on learning.
Third, experimental evolution demonstrates the evolution
of risk strategies. In one experiment, risky strategies arose by
imposing a selective regime that favored novel phenotypic
states. The result was that some of the populations evolved
the ability to “bet-hedge” by stochastically producing different phenotypes (Beaumont, Gallie, Kost, Ferguson, &
Rainey, 2009). In this study, risk attitudes are not taken as
fixed but seen as an adaptive outcome of selection.
Risk attitudes and decision under uncertainty play central roles in many areas of economics. The ability to fit
experimental results with standard risk aversion is debated
(Rabin, 2000). One of the first behavioral economic papers
introduces prospect theory as an alternative to expected
utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Experimental
evolution provides an experimental system to test theories
about the nature of risk preferences and risky decision
making.
There are, however, important questions regarding the
ability of experimental evolution to inform economics. We
address two issues here—the ability to extrapolate from nonhuman species to humans, and the relatively small number of
generations possible in experiments.
First, can we extrapolate studies on mice, bacteria, viruses,
and fruit flies to human economic behavior? If humans are
sufficiently different from other species, then experimental
evolution may not inform economic views of human nature.
This is not a purely theoretic view; there is evidence that
humans are different in ways that argue against experimental
evolution as a tool to study economic behavior. For example,
chimpanzees appear to be qualitatively less capable of overriding impulses than humans. When experimenters present
chimpanzees with symbolic representations of food, the animals are able to make good strategic choices. When actual
food is used, however, the chimpanzees do not learn, and
grab for the food, even when it is not in their strategic interest
(Boysen, Mukobi, & Berntson, 1999).
Chimpanzees, along with Bonobos, are the extant species
phylogenetically closest to humans (Hasegawa, Kishino, &
Yano, 1985). If our closest genetic relatives are very different
from humans on tasks that appear related to economic
choices, what can we learn about human economic behavior
from bacteria in a Petri dish?

Downloaded from by guest on August 5, 2016

4

SAGE Open

Second, can we run experiments for enough generations
to learn about human evolution? Consider that the fossil
specimen of “Lucy” classified as Australopithecus afarensis.
Lucy is estimated to have lived approximately 2.9 to 3.8 million years ago (Johanson & White, 1979). If we use a 20-year
generation, and 2.9 million years before present, then Lucy
preceded us by 145,000 generations. While some experiments on bacteria have continued for thousands of generations (Lenski, Rose, Simpson, & Tadler, 1991), for sexually
reproducing organisms (e.g., mice, fruit flies) it is challenging to run experiments for 100 generations.
Furthermore, as compared with extant primates and other
animals, Lucy is a relatively recent ancestor to modern
humans (Nei & Kumar, 2000). Thus, experimental evolution
is a very short version of the process that created humans.
Because of these issues, macroevolutionary events may be
sufficiently rare as to not be seen in experiment (Garland &
Rose, 2009; Oakley, 2009), and this leads some to argue that
simulations are better for such issues (Gavrilets & Vose,
2005).
In short, can experimental evolution studies using (a)
short-lived organisms, (b) which are phylogenetically distant
from modern humans, (c) for a relatively small number of
generations inform our views of human economic behavior?
While these concerns have merit, we believe that they can
be addressed. We know that animal models can inform
human issues because of successes in other fields. In medicine, for example, animal tests are a standard part of the
regulatory and scientific approval process. No human drug is
approved based solely on non-human tests; however, animal
tests are an important part of the process.
At the physiological level, human processes can be identical to that found in organisms that are phylogenetically distant from humans. For example, basic cell transport appears
to be highly conserved with common genes involved in vesicle traffic (Novick, Field, & Schekman, 1980), common
protein machinery for fusion to target (Rothman, 1994), and
common, specific signals for cargo release (Südhof & Jahn,
1991). This research on cell transport was performed on
organisms far from humans, including yeast, and it garnered
the 2013 Nobel Prize in medicine or physiology.
Non-human models are useful not just for basic cell function but also for mental processes, including Alzheimer’s
disease and dementia (Götz & Ittner, 2008; Smith, 1988).
Beyond disease, there are many aspects of human minds
where science has found animal models to be productive
(Cryan & Holmes, 2005; Dobbing, 1970; Lang, Davis, &
Öhman, 2000; D. Rice & Barone, 2000). We believe that animals can help us understand human economic behavior.
The second argument against experimental evolution is
that the studies are too short. A related idea has been labeled
“Darwin’s other mistake” by Michael Rose and Ted Garland
(Rose & Garland, 2009). Darwin’s first mistake was his
belief in blended inheritance, and his second mistake was the
idea, repeated many times in the Origin of Species, that evolution is slow and gradual.

Contrary to what Darwin believed, evolution can be rapid
and the rate of change can be uneven (Eldredge & Gould,
1972). Existing experimental evolutionary studies have demonstrated rapid enough evolution to be useful in a wide range
of areas and species (Garland & Rose, 2009). In the wild,
modern studies of “Darwin’s finches” document significant
evolutionary changes with a relatively small number of generations (Grant & Grant, 2002).
Finally, there is evidence of relatively recent and rapid
human evolution in the form of “selective sweeps.” In a
selective sweep, a new genetic variant arises and is strongly
selected for, often because of some change in the environment. While there is debate about the number of such recent
sweeps in humans, there is a broad agreement that they have
occurred (Akey, 2009; Akey et al., 2004; Hernandez et al.,
2011; Voight, Kudaravalli, Wen, & Pritchard, 2006).
Selective sweeps are argued to have occurred relatively
recently in humans in the areas of malarial resistance (Sabeti
et al., 2002; Tishkoff et al., 2001), salt preferences
(Thompson et al., 2004), and the ability to digest lactose in
adult humans (Bersaglieri et al., 2004).
In summary, we believe that animal models can be informative for human behavior, and that evolution can be rapid
enough to be observed in experiments.
We argue for a program of economically motivated,
experimental evolution studies. Experimental evolution is a
promising approach that has yielded benefits in other areas.
It is one of the few approaches that can address the important
topic of economic preferences.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: The section
“Experimental Evolution” provides a primer on experimental evolution for social scientists with economists as a particular audience. The section “Methodology for Experimental
Evolution and Economics” contains a methodology for performing experimental evolution and economics studies. The
section “Experiments on Economic Preferences” describes
studies using experimental evolution to inform economics.
These experiments cover attitudes toward goods, risk, time,
and the decision process. The article ends with the
“Discussion” on a possible future for experimental evolution
and economics.

Experimental Evolution
Introduction
Experimental evolution is a well-developed methodology
where the experimenter designs one or more test environments and measures the impact of the test environment(s) on
genotype and phenotype relative to the control environment
(Garland & Rose, 2009; Lenski et al., 1991).
Organisms, derived from a common stock, are randomly
selected to be placed in the different environments.
Commonly, test and control environments differ in precisely
one aspect. Statistical inference is used to attribute the differences between the groups of organisms to evolution in
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Figure 1. Experimental evolution.
Figure 3. Adaptive landscapes representation of an experiment.

Figure 2. Adaptive landscape.

Source. Adapted from Wright (1932, p. 358).

the different environments. Figure 1 provides a summary of
experimental evolution.

Environmental Design
Experimental evolution examines the genetic evolutionary
trajectory of groups of organisms in different environments.
The idea of an “adaptive landscape” is central to experimental evolution.
Sewall Wright (1932) invented the adaptive landscape
concept, and Figure 2 (above) is Figure 2 from his original
paper on the topic. The x- and y-axes represent the genetic
variants of two genes. The third dimension represents adaptive value, or fitness, in modern evolutionary terminology.
Areas marked with “+” are peaks or relative maxima, while
“−” represent valleys or relative minima. All the points on one
contour line have the same fitness value. Within an actual organism, the adaptive landscape will be of much higher dimension
(and would be very difficult to illustrate graphically).
At any given time, each individual can be placed at a
single location in the landscape, determined by the alleles at

the two loci that are represented by the axes. In general, the
individuals within a population will not be evenly distributed around the landscape but more likely to be near one
location. In equilibrium, Wright states, “The species will
occupy a certain field of variation about a peak in our diagram” (p. 360).
When populations are not in equilibrium, the individuals
are not expected to be clustered around local maxima. In such
cases, Sewall Wright argued, “A species whose individuals
are clustered about some combination other than the highest
would move up the steepest gradient toward the peak”
(pp. 357-358). Selection favors evolution toward areas with
higher fitness values—uphill in the adaptive landscape.
In addition to selection, which favors fitness increasing
evolution, there are three non-adaptive evolutionary forces
(Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Slatkin, 1977): genetic drift
(Lande, 1976), mutation, and gene flow. In the history of
evolutionary thought, the relative importance of non-adaptive evolution has had more or less emphasis at various times
(see, for example, Gould, 2002, pp. 522-526).

Control and Test Environments in the Adaptive
Landscape Framework
For selection to produce differences in an experimental evolution study, the test and control environments must have different adaptive landscapes. The test and control populations
are expected to start at the same average coordinates in the
landscape. If the topology of the two environments is different at these initial coordinates, then selection will favor
divergence between the control and test groups.
Figure 3 is a representation of the adaptive landscapes in
an experimental evolution study. The test and control populations are randomly selected from an initial stock; thus, both
are expected to begin the experiment from the same location
on the adaptive landscape.
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If the initial stock is in equilibrium with the control environment, then the populations might both start at local maxima for the control environment. In such cases, stabilizing
selection is expected to keep the control organisms in the
initial location. The diagram illustrates a case where the control and test environments’ local maxima are not the same as
the beginning location.
For selection to create differences between the test and
control organisms, the direction of selective pressure must be
different. In Figure 3, the test and control organisms start at
the same location in the lower left of the diagram, and over
evolutionary time move toward the local maxima in their
respective fitness landscapes.
In most, and possibly all, experimental evolution studies
conducted to date, the experimenter does not know the topology of the adaptive landscape. Selection works on phenotype, while the adaptive landscape is a representation of
genotype (Lewontin, 1974). For example, in a study of desiccation resistance in Drosophila, the test environment has less
moisture than the control environment (Gibbs, Chippindale,
& Rose, 1997). The experimenter may have some idea about
which genes may be favored in the test environment, but to
date, not enough is known to have any specific idea of the
fitness landscape.

Population Is the Unit of Study in Experimental
Evolution
Experimental evolution studies changes between test and
control at the population level. In general, individuals will
vary in their genotype. Variations between individuals exist
because non-adaptive change prevents all individuals from
converging to the same genetic sequence and because the
fitness of an allele depends on the distribution of genes at
other loci (R. Fisher, 1930; Hartl & Clark, 1997; Lewontin,
1970).
In addition, some equilibria will not be a unique location
in the adaptive landscape, but rather a stable distribution of
genes. This occurs when different phenotypes have fitness
that is dependent on relatively frequencies. In such cases,
equilibrium may not be a single allele but a stable distribution of alleles (Hardy, 1908; Stern, 1943; Weinberg, 1908).
For example, in geographic areas with malaria, the allele that
causes sickle cell anemia is selected for because of its beneficial effect in people who are heterozygous (Allison, 1954;
Pauling, Itano, Singer, & Wells, 1949).
A population is a group of individuals that has no gene
flow with other populations. Experimental evolution uses
replicate populations in each treatment. In practice, several different test and control populations are created, and
the organisms within each population only interact and
breed with each other. We apply our experimental treatments to populations and replicate treatments on different
populations.

Summary of Experimental Evolution for
Economists
Experimental evolution allows the empirical investigation of
the axioms of economics. Replicate populations are maintained in a control environment and one or more test environments. Over multiple generations, the phenotype and
genotype of the populations can be studied. Because the
adaptive landscapes are designed, experimental evolution
allows control and can be replicated.

Methodology for Experimental
Evolution and Economics
Design a Fitness Landscape
The experiments in the subsequent section are described in
terms of a fitness landscape. Table 1 describes the simplest,
non-degenerate fitness landscape for experimental evolution.
With sufficient experimental creativity, selection can be
applied to any aspect of phenotype. Table 1 shows the following attributes:
•• There is a test environment and a control environment.
•• The control environment imposes no selective pressure on phenotype A versus phenotype B.
•• The test environment creates selective pressure for
phenotype B over phenotype A.
If experimental selection creates evolution, B will become
more frequent in the test populations. A and B can be associated with a wide variety of areas of interest, including behavior toward goods, risk, or time. This setting can be extended
by adding phenotypes or environments. The relative fitness
of different phenotypes can be adjusted arbitrarily subject to
the experimental methods used to create the fitness landscape (see subsequent discussion).

Create the Fitness Landscape Experimentally
There are some important considerations in creating a fitness
landscape that are difficult to describe in the abstract. For
most of this article, we have purposely not specified any species, nor have we described the method of creating the fitness
landscape.
In this section, we discuss some specifics of using
Drosophila to induce preferences. One specific approach
to creating such an experimental landscape is to use
Drosophila and their oviposition (the location of egg laying) as a means of creating selection on phenotype. In this
case, A and B represent physical areas where the Drosophila
lay eggs that are distinct geographically and/or temporally.
The distinct areas may be associated with attributes such
as color, odor, and temperature.

Downloaded from by guest on August 5, 2016

7

Burnham et al.

Measure Evolution

Table 1. Fitness Landscape Where Phenotype B Has Higher
Fitness for Test Populations.
Phenotype

Test environment
Control environment

A

B

1
1

2
1

To create a fitness landscape, the experimenter must create different probabilities of an egg getting to the next generation (“hazard rate” hereafter). To impose the landscape in
Table 1, one simple approach would be to use a hazard rate
of 100% for B in the test condition, and 50% for eggs laid in
Choice A in both conditions and 50% for eggs laid in Choice
B in the control condition. Table 2 contains a hypothetic
example implementing this simple approach.
The method described in Table 2 creates the correct,
relative hazard rates to create the fitness landscape in
Table 1 (in practice, the number of eggs will always be an
integer). However, there is a practical problem with the
example shown in Table 2, as there are population density
effects in Drosophila. Thus, the population that begins the
generation with 211 eggs will be subject to different forces
than the population that begins with 77 eggs. The goal of
the experiment was to create control and test environments that differ in exactly one aspect. For Drosophila, it
is important to keep initial populations to the same or
similar sizes.
A method to address density dependence in Drosophila is
to start every generation with the same number of eggs. Table
3 shows the same example in terms of number of eggs laid as
Table 2 but constrains each condition to start the subsequent
generation with 50 eggs.
The correct fitness landscape is created using the process
shown in Table 3. In the control environment, the hazard rate
is the same for A and B (32.47%). In the test environment,
there is selective pressure for B as the hazard rate for B
(24.88%) is two times that of A (12.44%).
This solution creates the correct relative hazard rates, and
it creates equivalent starting population sizes, thus removing
density dependent effects. Operationally, this process
requires the experimenter to use different hazard rates
depending on the number of eggs laid. This adds an addition
level of complexity to the step where eggs are harvested to
start the next generation.
The message here is that expertise regarding the specifics
of the experimental species is required. To create an experiment, the goal is to associate aspects of phenotype, with
engineered, relative hazard rates. Furthermore, the creation
of the relative hazard rates ought to be performed in a manner that does not produce any other differences between test
and control environments beyond the aspect(s) of planned
study.

Once the experiment commences, it is possible to study phenotype and genotype. For example, Figure 4 shows a hypothetical outcome where organisms in the text condition
evolve to exhibit more of Phenotype B.
The test environment can be the same as the selective
environment, or it can be different. Consider, for example,
a Drosophila experiment where, during selection, flies can
lay eggs on one of two surfaces. One surface is associated
with a level of added odor, the second surface with no
added odor.
One environment that could be used to evaluate the experiment would be to present flies with the exact same two odor
levels and measure percentage of eggs laid on the surface
with the added odor. We describe this by saying that the test
environment is the same as the selective environment.
There are, however, additional types of test environments.
For example, if the test environment with two levels of odor
is labeled (high, none), it might be interesting to observe flies
in an environment both higher levels of odor and intermediate. For example, these could be labeled very high, high,
medium, none, or very high, medium.
Using a test environment that differs from the selective
environment may provide insight into the mechanistic details
of the phenotype. For example, including additional odor
levels beyond those used in selection may differentiate
between mechanisms that favor a particular level from others
that select based on relative levels.

Experiments on Economic Preferences
Introduction
In this section, we sketch out some experimental ideas that
we believe could be useful for economics. There are benefits
and costs to laying out part of an experimental agenda. The
benefit of describing some experiments is to make the proposition of this article more concrete. In addition, people may
want to pursue these specific experimental ideas, and we
encourage people to perform experiments motivated by these
sketches.
The cost of laying out some specific experiments is that
the list is necessarily incomplete. Furthermore, each individual experiment may appear poorly designed. The planning stage for a single experiment can take several years.
Thus, describing multiple experiments, even at a high
level, in one paper may not do justice to the power of the
approach.
Weighing these costs and benefits, we proceed to sketch
some experiments. We believe that this is an ambitious
experimental list in addressing some of the most important
issues in economics. However, this list only scratches the
surface of the possible research program of experimental
evolution and economics.
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Table 2. Creating a Fitness Landscape.

Test
Control

A
No. harvested /no. eggs laid, hazard rate

B
No. harvested /no. eggs laid, hazard rate

No. of eggs to start next generation

63 / 126, 50%
26.5 / 53, 50%

138 / 138, 100%
50.5 / 101, 50%

63 + 138 = 211
26 + 51 = 77

Table 3. Creating a Fitness Landscape With Constant Initial Starting Population.

Test
Control

A
No. harvested / no. eggs laid, % harvested

B
No. harvested / no. eggs laid, % harvested

No. of eggs to start next generation

15.7 / 126, 12.44%
17.2 / 53, 32.47%

34.3 / 138, 24.88%
32.8 / 101, 32.47%

15.7 + 34.3 = 50
17.2 + 32.8 = 50

Figure 4. Hypothetical results where selective pressure favors
Phenotype B.

Figure 5. Selective environment for creating a good.

Experiment 1: Creation of a Good

This simple experiment where more of an attribute/good
is favored by selection may inform a number of important
issues within economics.

Can an economic good be created?
Economics is silent about the origin of attitudes toward
goods. “De gustibus non est disputandum” is an important
paper about preferences (Stigler & Becker, 1977). The
authors explain that economics take preferences as given,
and research on the origin of preferences is left to “whoever
studies and explains tastes (psychologists? Phrenologists?
Sociobiologists?)” (p. 76).
We expect pleasure to be associated with behaviors that
led to evolutionary success (higher inclusive fitness) for
ancestral humans. Experimentally, to create selective
pressure for a good, construct a test environment that
associates higher fitness with more of some attribute
(Figure 5).
Any number of attributes could be used to create a fitness
landscape where more is better. These include temperature,
odors, visual cues, or food of various types. It will be important to select an attribute that the organism can perceive and
one where there may be genetic variation regarding the
attribute.

Variation between individuals.
The standard economic model is silent on the nature of
goods, and it does not constrain different individuals to like
similar goods. Thus, the standard economic framework
allows an individual to prefer cyanide to food. It also allows
one person to prefer cocaine to pasta, and another individual
(even the individual’s identical twin) to have the reverse
taste. Empirically, experimental evolution can investigate the
sources and extent of variation.
Time scale.
If preferences are shaped by the environment, and the
environment is changing, possibly rapidly relative to genetic
evolution, how do preferences change over time? If preferences were shaped by evolution to produce fitness maximizing behavior, what happens when the payoffs to behavior
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change? How does the organism change, and how long does
it take? For example, it is hypothesized that the human taste
for high fat food and calories was an adaptation for our
ancestors who were frequently hungry (Irons, 1998). In
industrialized societies, however, many people would live
longer if they had different preferences. Experimental evolution allows empirical measurement of rates of change in
preferences.
Self-destructive preferences and will power.
Why do many humans engage in behaviors that lead to
both unhappiness and low biological fitness? For example,
many people get intense pleasure from cigarettes and a number of other drugs, including alcohol. The economic approach
takes these preferences as given and then asks how a person
would maximize happiness, given their tastes.
Self-control issues arise when an individual desires something, yet wants to control its consumption. Some economic
models assume internal conflict (Fudenberg & Levine,
2006), an aspect not contained in the rational view of addiction. Self-control remains an active area of economic research
(DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2004) decades after earlier work
(Schelling, 1984; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).
An evolutionary perspective might explain why certain
substances are both pleasurable and unhealthful. A changing
adaptive landscape might produce organisms with preferences for fitness decreasing behaviors. Of particular relevance is the notion that humans began changing the world
quite rapidly relative to the pace of human genetic change
with the invention of agriculture (Barkow, Cosmides, &
Tooby, 1992; Bowlby, 1969; Wilson, 1978).
Dietary preferences are a specific manifestation of this
idea of “mismatch” between human genes and modern
industrialized conditions. As noted previously, the human
taste for fat, salt, and excess calories is hypothesized to
reflect positive fitness payoffs in ancestral conditions (Irons,
1998). In the ancestral environment, the marginal value of an
additional gram of dietary fat is hypothesized to be positive.
For many people today, the marginal fitness value of dietary
fat is negative. Our self-control struggles may be productively viewed as the product of a mismatch between ancestral
and modern fitness landscapes.

Experiment 2: Non-Monotonic and Other-Shaped
Preferences
Is more always better? Standard economic models assume
that preferences are monotonic, with more being better than
less. If preferences are not monotonic, then some of the most
important conclusions of economics would not hold. For
example, the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem states that,
under certain conditions, all market outcomes are pareto
optimal. This welfare theorem can be viewed as a mathematical version of Adam Smith’s famous invisible hand

Figure 6. Fitness landscape for creating non-monotonic
preferences.

argument. However, the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem
is proved by assuming that preferences are monotonic.
In natural settings, there is no such expectation that preferences will be monotonic. For example, intermediate temperatures are preferred to extremes for all animals.
A simple adaptive landscape for the evolution of nonmonotonic preferences is shown in Figure 6.
The test environment produces selective pressure for nonmonotonic preferences. Over evolutionary time, the behavior
can be observed to determine if intermediate levels are preferred to extremes. If a “taste for moderation” arises in the
selective environment, it would then be informative to look
at levels that are not included in selective environment. If
non-monotonic preferences can arise, there would be fundamental implications for economics.
Many other experiments on the shape of preferences can
be conducted. For example, it is possible to construct convex
and concave preferences (Figure 7). Any combination of
shapes is also possible with linear areas, convex, concave,
and so on.
Finally, it would also be informative to impose no selection over certain levels of an attribute, and then observe preferences in those regions. There is a literature in biology on
one-sided decision rules. Herring gulls, for example, have
“bigger is better” decision rules with regard to caring for
their eggs. Bigger appears to be better in natural settings
(Parsons, 1970) but can produce very strange outcomes in
experimentally modified settings (Baerends & Drent, 1982a,
1982b; Baerends & Krujit, 1973).
One of the central paradoxes in human behavior is that
people seem to have a one-sided decision rule with regard to
wealth, even though there appear to be no fitness or happiness benefits from more money above some level.
Ancestral humans could not accumulate any substantial
wealth until the invention of pottery for storage, perhaps
beginning as early as 30,000 years before present (P. M.
Rice, 1999). To the extent that human tastes for resources
were importantly shaped in the Pleistocene (the epoch that
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Figure 7. Creating concave and convex preferences.

Figure 8. Creating substitutes and complements.

ended 10,000 years ago), unlimited taste for money may be
an outdated, one-sided decision rule.

Experiment 3: More Than One Good—
Substitutes and Complements
Substitute goods satisfy similar wants, so that more consumption of one good leads to less desire for consumption of
a substitute. Conversely, more consumption of one good
leads to increased desire for consumption of a complement.
As with attitudes about individual goods, most economics
takes attitudes toward multiple goods as exogenous.
Experimental evolution allows empirical investigation of
attitudes toward more than one good. Figure 8 shows simple
adaptive landscapes for perfect substitutes and complements.
In the case of perfect substitutes, the fitness of a combination
is equal to the sum of the levels of the two goods. In the case
of perfect complements, the fitness of a combination is equal
to the minimum of the two goods.
It is possible to build fitness landscapes with more than
two goods. It is also possible to construct more complex
landscapes. For example, goods could be substitutes in one
region and complements in a second region. Finally, it is
possible to layer in convex, concave, linear, or non-monotonic preferences into experiments on more than one good.

Experiment 4: Risk Premia
Some of the most important economic decisions have uncertain outcomes, including financial investments, career
choice, and education level. Neoclassical economics assumes
that people make such uncertain decisions to maximize
expected utility, using risk tastes that vary both as a function
of their personalities and as a function of their wealth.
Expected utility theory is grounded in a 1738 formulation
by Daniel Bernoulli, who emphasized that monetary outcomes must be translated into utility, which varies depending
on circumstances: “No valid measurement of the value of a
risk can be obtained without consideration being given to its
utility . . . the utility of an item may change with circumstances” (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24). In 1947, Bernoulli’s insight
was formalized, based on von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s
(1947) axioms, and subsequently expected utility theory has
been the standard (neoclassical) economic theory of decision
under uncertainty.
The critiques of the expected utility theory began even
before Bernoulli’s formulation (e.g., St. Petersburg paradox, 1713; created by Daniel Bernoulli’s cousin Nicolas
Bernoulli) and continue to the modern period (Allais, 1953;
de Montmort, 1713; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Rabin, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2001). Many behavioral economists favor “prospect theory” over expected
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utility theory. Two important aspects of prospect theory are
as follows: (a) “Value is assigned to gains and losses rather
than to final assets.” (b) “The value function is . . . generally steeper for losses than for gains” (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, p. 263).
Prospect theory and expected utility theory have very different implications in a wide variety of important economic
problems. For example, in the area of asset pricing, “The differences between our [prospect theory] framework and a . . .
[expected utility framework] are highlighted by the distinct
predictions of each” (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001, p. 3).
In their 2001 review, Rabin and Thaler argue that economics should consign expected utility theory to the dustbin
of history: “It is time for economists to recognize that
expected utility is an ex-hypothesis” (p. 230). Notwithstanding
the behavioral critique, expected utility theory remains the
foundation of mainstream economic approaches to decisions
with uncertainty.
An evolutionary model of endogenous preferences concludes that as long as there is no chance of extinction, natural
selection favors risk neutrality (Robson, 1996). If there is a
chance of extinction, then selection favors risk aversion
(over payoffs in inclusive fitness units).
Organisms often make decision over food and other
attributes with indirect translations into fitness. In such
cases, if the translation between a behavior and fitness is
concave, risk aversion is optimal. If the translation to fitness is convex, risk seeking (also labeled “risk prone” in
the biology literature) is optimal (Caraco, Martindale, &
Whittam, 1980; Stephens, 1981; for a review, see McNamara
& Houston, 1992). Empirically, animals tend to be risk
averse over variability in amount and risk prone over variability in delay (Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik & El
Mouden, 2013); there is no agreed-upon theoretical explanation for the observed regularities in uncertain decisions
in non-human animals.
In summary, decision making under uncertainty is an
unresolved important topic for both humans and non-human
animals. Experimental evolution allows empirical investigation of these questions. In addition, experimental evolution
allows for mechanistic investigations into decisions under
uncertainty. If test and control populations are created, then
mechanistic differences between populations can be investigated. A recent review paper underscores the need for this
type of investigation for uncertain decisions: “A Tinbergian
persistence of simultaneous interest in function and mechanism would be a good thing” (Kacelnik & El Mouden, 2013,
p. 1128).
One experimental evolution study selected for phenotypic switching in bacteria by selecting for change
(Beaumont et al., 2009). Specifically, alternate generations grew in media that was either shaken or unshaken
because variants with an advantage in one environment
have a disadvantage in the subsequent environment. The
subsequent generation begins with the most common,

Table 4. A Generalized Framework for Risk and Return
Experiments.
Phenotype
A

Test environment
Control environment

B

Mean

Variance

Mean

Variance

1
1

1
1

x
1

y
1

novel phenotype from the prior generation. The outcome
is that each generation begins with two different phenotypes, with a single genotype. This outcome is labeled bethedging because one genotype produces two phenotypes,
and, in the experiment, one of these two phenotypes makes
it to the next generation.
This pioneering study illustrates the power of experimental evolution in understanding decisions under uncertainty.
Selection produced new populations better adapted to the
novel environment than the ancestral population. Furthermore,
it was possible to analyze the genetic changes that accompanied the evolution.
We propose an experimental evolution study of risk premia. To accomplish this study, we construct a test environment where the payoff associated with an aspect of phenotype
has both different mean and variance than in the control environment. It is possible to study the risk premium in such an
experiment. This allows an empirical calculation of the sign
and magnitude of the risk premium.
Table 4 describes a generalized framework for experiments on risk and return. The control environment is normalized to have a mean fitness and variance of 1. Test
environments can be constructed for a variety of questions
by setting x and y appropriately.
Does evolution favor risk aversion? The experimental
setup for investigating this question would have x = 1 and y
> 1. In this case, test and control have the same mean fitness,
while the test lines have a higher risk.
What is trade-off between risk and return? A series of
experiments could be conducted with x > 1 and y > 1. If
higher risk increases the chance of extinction, how much
additional average fitness compensates for some measured
increase in risk? With this design, it would be possible to
measure the trade-off between risk and return.
It is also possible to conduct experiments on skew and
higher moments. For example, a skew column could be
added to Table 4. One possible experiment would be to have
test and control environments with identical mean and variance but different skewness.
Finally, it would be possible to contrast prospect theory
preferences with expected utility preferences. The experimental approach would be to create different lines that
exhibit these preferences and then use a competitive assay to
measure relative success of the two sets of preferences.
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Experiment 5: Evolution of Time Preference

Table 5. Generalized Framework for Discounting.

How patient or impatient are humans, and what role did natural selection play in the evolution of time preference?
Experimental evolution allows the empirical investigation of
attitudes toward time.
Economists assume that later time periods have lower
value—people are assumed to discount the future. As discussed in the subsequent experiment, there is disagreement
whether the form of the discounting is exponential or hyperbolic, but most behavioral scientists agree that people
discount.
In 1930, the famous economist Irving Fisher (1930) connected discounting with a probability of dying writing: “The
chance of death may be said to be the most important rational
factor tending to increase impatience; anything that would tend
to prolong human life would tend, at the same time, to reduce
impatience” (pp. 84-85). Presumably, Fisher’s view is grounded
in an implicit role of natural selection in creating preferences.
While Fisher assumed that discounting was based on the
chance of death, more recent theoretical work has explicitly
modeled time preference. An economic model of endogenous preferences investigates the relationship between
patience and various attributes including income, mortality,
and even religious beliefs (Becker & Mulligan, 1997). The
payoffs in this model are not grounded in biological fitness,
which produces some interesting speculation:
If consumers expect positive utility after death—perhaps
because they believe they will go to heaven—this raises
their investments in future-oriented capital because their
future utilities are increased. In equilibrium, therefore,
consumers who expect to go to heaven will discount the
future less. (p. 741)

A biological model of endogenous time preference that
uses demographic parameters from human populations
before the creation of birth control, argues that the discount
rate ought to be around 2% per year, and that younger people
should discount at higher rates (Rogers, 1994). In this model,
younger people have lower chances of death, and this effect
by itself would make young people more patient. However,
the model uses fertility rates to estimate the value of current
consumption. The higher fertility rates for young people in
this model outweigh the lower chance of death, and the overall conclusion is that discount rates will be higher for young
people.
Empirical studies in the evolution of senescence literature
connect selection with lifespan. In a natural experiment,
senescence was measured in two groups of wild opossums: a
mainland group and an island population (separate for
approximately 5,000 years) with reduced predation. As compared with the mainland group, the island group displayed
delayed senescence (Austad, 1993). In a laboratory experimental evolution study, Drosophila senescence was delayed

Relative fitness

Control
Test

Now

Future

1
1

1
A

Figure 9. Evolution of discounting.

by choosing eggs that were laid by older females (Rose,
1984). These studies are consistent with the evolutionary
view that senescence is an outcome of selection. Both the
decreased external hazard rate for island opossum and selecting Drosophila eggs laid later in life increase the relative
value of later periods.
Experimental evolution in the aging literature has already
provided empirical insight into the evolution of time preference. Table 5 contains fitness payoffs for further experimental evolution on time preference.
An experiment with A < 1 creates selective pressure to
value the present over the future. Maintaining the value of A
below 1 but varying its value allows investigation of relative
pressure for impatience. For example, an experiment could
contrast two test environments with A = 0.9 and 0.45, respectively (Figure 9).
Mathematically, an experiment with A > 1 would create
pressure to value the future over the present. While economics assumes that discount rates will always be positive (the
present has higher value than the future), there is no reason to
believe that this is always favored by selection.
There are myriad natural examples where animals prefer
later over now; for example, a wide variety of animals, including squirrels, birds, cache nuts, seeds, and other foods (Vander
Wall, 1990). These animals often retrieve much of the food they
cache. However, they always retrieve less than 100% of the
food they store, thus earning a negative return on their savings.
Cicadas demonstrate a different form of patience also
present broadly in non-human animals. Some cicada species
mate only once every 13 or 17 years (Williams, Smith, &
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Stephen, 1993). The cicadas live for long periods in the soil
and only mate after morphing and emerging above ground.
By synchronizing their emergence, the cicadas overwhelm
the ability of predators to consume them. The prime numbers
between mating periods are thought to make it more difficult
for predators to also breed cyclically but with higher frequency, thereby facilitating higher than average predator
population sizes on cicada hatching years. These cicadas
exhibit a form of patience by waiting for so long to mate.
In summary, discounting is a vitally important topic
within economics. For the most part, economics takes as
given that people value the present more than the future.
There is no theoretical framework within economics to predict discount rates, how discount rates will vary as a function
of circumstances (e.g., sex, age, wealth), or variation in discount rates between individuals. There is limited, theoretical
work on connected discounting with biological payoffs.
Experimental evolution allows a wide range of empirical
studies into the evolution of patience (and impatience).

Experiment 6: Structure of Time Preferences
Experimental evolution provides an empirical tool to study
the role of natural selection in shaping the structure of intertemporal decision making.
Economics is divided about how people make intertemporal decisions (also known as discounting). Neoclassical
economists assume that people are patient and consistent. In
contrast, behavioral scholars argue that people are impatient
and inconsistent. Intertemporal decisions are among the most
important areas in economics as they include education, savings, investments, productivity, and these decisions affect the
wealth of both individuals and nations.
Neoclassical economics assume that humans use “exponential discounting” where consumption in each period has
lower value than consumption in earlier periods. Furthermore,
exponential discounting assumes that adjacent periods have
constant, relative weights. Exponential discounting dates
back to 1937: “We assume in the first instance that the rate of
discount of future utilities is a constant” (Samuelson, 1937,
p. 156).
Behavioral economists argue that people discount hyperbolically (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Frederick, Loewenstein,
& O’Donoghue, 2002; Laibson, 1997). Hyperbolic discounting models allow the discount between today and tomorrow
to be larger than the discount between other adjacent periods.
This creates a bias toward current consumption, and it also
creates inconsistency (Figure 10).
In laboratory experiments, non-human animals exhibit the
high value on today that is consistent with hyperbolic discounting (Frederick et al., 2002). Pigeons, for example, will
chose a smaller, sooner reward over a later, larger reward
even if the larger reward is much bigger (Ainslie &
Herrnstein, 1981; Green, Fischer, Perlow, & Sherman, 1981).

Figure 10. Exponential (neoclassical) and hyperbolic (behavioral)
weights.

A biological model of time preference concludes that
selection should not favor the reversals of hyperbolic discounting (Robson, 2001). However, with some level of
uncertainty, hyperbolic discounting is argued to be optimal
(Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005).
Economics has not resolved the issues about intertemporal decision making, and this is important. Most theories rest
upon assumptions of exponential discounting, yet the data
suggest that this is not a good description of human behavior.
To cite one example of many for why this is important,
hyperbolic savers will have different savings and consumption decisions than exponential discounters (Angeletos,
Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, & Weinberg, 2001).
Experimental evolution provides a novel, empirical
approach to investigate this important economic issue. The
core of experiments on intertemporal choice involved designing selective environments. For example, it is possible to run
experiments that contrast exponential and hyperbolic discounting (Figure 11).
In this experiment, selection favors hyperbolic discounting in one condition and exponential discounting in another.
The populations that evolve can then be tested in some form
of competitive paradigm appropriate for the experimental
species (Fellowes, Kraaijeveld, & Godfray, 1998; Santos,
Fowler, & Partridge, 1992).
More generally, experimental evolution allows the systematic, empirical study of discounting with many different
fitness landscapes. The long-term hope of such studies is to
allow the neoclassical and behavior views to be merged to
improve economics.
In summary, intertemporal decisions are among the most
important in economics. There is an important unresolved
debate over whether humans and non-humans are exponential or hyperbolic discounters. Experimental evolution is a
novel approach to this important problem and may be able to
improve economics.
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We believe that humans are productively viewed as existing in an altered adaptive landscape. This altered landscape
was not produced by an experimenter but rather by rapid
technological change (Barkow et al., 1992; Wilson, 1978).
Many of the puzzles in economics may be resolved by viewing humans as existing in an altered adaptive landscape
(Burnham & Phelan, 2000).
What might the impact on economics be of a sustained
program using experimental evolution? Our informed speculation includes the following:
1.

Figure 11. Creating exponential and hyperbolic discounting.

2.

Discussion
We are enthusiastic proponents of using experimental evolution to study, and ultimately improve, economics. There are
three primary reasons for our optimism.
First, economics is divided currently between the neoclassical and behavioral schools. This division is based on a
profound disagreement over human nature as reified in preferences. The neoclassical versus behavioral disagreement
began decades ago, and we are not optimistic that the current approaches within economics will lead to a synthesis.
Experimental evolution is an approach where preferences
are endogenous. Thus, it is possible to study the role of selection in shaping the core axioms of economics. Our hope and
expectation is that experimental evolution can provide a path
to a synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral economics
grounded in an empirically informed view of human nature.
Second, experimental evolution is consistent with a series
of advances in economics that use the strong inference
allowed by true experiments. Experimental economics is a
well-established approach that began in modern form in the
late 1940s and 1950s (historical accounts are found in the
introductions of Davis & Holt, 1993; Kagel & Roth, 1995).
Over the past half century or so, experimental economics has
moved from a novel, fringe activity to the core of many areas
of economics (Smith, 1982).
More recently, randomized experiments have been
increasingly used to evaluate social policy (Banerjee &
Duflo, 2008; Heckman, 1991). For example, one frequently
cited paper using randomization reports that deworming of
schoolchildren produced important education improvement
at very low cost relative to other approaches such as decreasing student–teacher ratios (Miguel & Kremer, 2004). The
success of randomized social policy studies has led to “a
veritable explosion of randomized experiments in development economics” (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008, p. 1).
Third, we feel experimental evolution captures an important aspect of modern human existence. In experimental evolution, the test populations are placed in an experimentally
altered adaptive landscape.

There is selective pressure for optimal behavior. In
accordance with neoclassical economic views, selection favors behaviors that lead to higher fitness. There
is evolutionary pressure to optimize.
Humans are not in equilibrium with the environment.
Many neoclassical economic models assume that
humans make optimal decisions over novel aspects
of the environment. These range from food selection
to financial instruments to technology itself. For
novel products or attributes, there has been very little
time for humans to evolve to be in synch with these
aspects.

Economics is currently a field divided upon itself; neoclassical and behavioral economists are at odds with each
other over human nature. Economic preferences are exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious. Within an experimental
evolution framework, preferences can become endogenous,
non-axiomatic, and harmonious.
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